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The Law of Patient Innovation 
Sam F. Halabi* 
Tim Richard** 
ABSTRACT 
Although the movement for patient empowerment has been under way for decades, 
patients remain relatively marginalized by medical providers, innovators, and pay-
ers. Physicians diagnose and prescribe treatment, innovators endeavor to develop 
drugs and devices that they can recommend to both physicians and payers, includ-
ing Medicare. Patients remain in the background, presumed to be passive recipients 
of breakthroughs that follow this system of discovery and finance. The law is a 
significant reason why this is so. This Article outlines the most significant areas of 
law that need to change to allow patients to innovate in collaborative partnership 
with their physicians, including the law of tort, human subjects research, healthcare 
finance, and intellectual property. By identifying these areas, changes and modifi-
cations to law may be more easily assessed by both state and federal law-makers. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite a decades-long movement nominally committed to patient autonomy, 
informed consent, and sovereignty, the actual position of the patient in the modern 
U.S. healthcare system remains largely that of a passive recipient of the advice of 
providers (generally physicians) and the drugs and devices of biomedical develop-
ers and manufacturers.1 Although researchers have developed measures of patient 
engagement and patient activation, the average patient follows up on referrals to 
specialists, fills and manages medications, and complies with physical therapy and 
other regimes provided by others.2 
To some extent, this dynamic results from the knowledge disparities between 
patients on the one hand and, on the other, providers and innovators. Physicians are 
extensively trained, and patients may be easily misled by poor information, or mis-
understand valid information. 
Online health information is difficult to regulate, meaning quality control is a 
challenge, and, further, patients vary widely in their health information literacy. Bad 
health information used in an improper way can be highly detrimental. Patients 
might trust misleading information or might make important health decisions based 
on sensationalized or emotionally charged stories that are not relevant to their health 
context.3 
Yet patients also have a tremendous amount of knowledge about their own 
conditions and many of them are well-equipped to help adapt and innovate treat-
ments. Their incentives are almost always aligned with outcomes.4 Patients want to 
heal and they want to invest in what they need to do so.5 This is particularly true for 
patients with complex, rare, or unknown diagnoses.6 
Consider the case of Doug Lindsay. Doug suffered from debilitating and de-
generative chronic fatigue. Related maladies ran through his family history, but 
there was never an effective diagnosis or treatment.7 After consulting a 2,200-page 
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1.Barbara Chubak, Clinical Responsibility in the Age of Patient Autonomy, 11(8) VIRTUAL MENTOR 567, 
Aug. 2009, at 567. (“The Principles of Biomedical Ethics by Thomas Beauchamp and James Childress, 
arguably the foundational text of contemporary bioethics, was first published in 1979 at the close of a 
decade that witnessed the rise of the international patients’ rights movement. In the United States, this 
movement placed, and continues to place, a particular emphasis on individual choice, in keeping with 
the dominant political ethos of our nation, which since its conception has privileged the enlightened, 
rational, and productive individual actor. Out of these ideas, the principle of respect for autonomy was 
born, and, since then, the influence of this single principle on the provision of health care and conduct 
of biomedical research has eclipsed that of the other principles: beneficence, nonmaleficence, and jus-
tice.”). 
 2. Len Schlesinger & John Fox, Giving Patients an Active Role in Their Health Care, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Nov. 21, 2016. 
 3. Tabitha Tonsaker, MSc, Gillian Bartlett, PhD, & Cvetan Trpkov, Health information on the Inter-
net: Gold mine or minefield?, 60(5) CANADIAN FAM. PHYSICIAN 407, May 2014, at 407. 
 4. https://healthpayerintelligence.com/news/patient-incentives-from-payers-encourage-preventive-
care-visits 
 5. Harold DeMonaco, Pedro Oliveira, Andrew Torrance, Christiana von Hippel, & Eric von Hippel, 
When Patients Become Innovators, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., Feb. 21, 2019. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Ryan Prior, This College Dropout was Bedridden for 11 Years. Then he Invented a Surgery and 
Cured Himself, CNN (July 27, 2019, 11:40 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/27/health/doug-lindsay-
invented-surgery-trnd/index.html. 
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endocrinology textbook he happened upon, he reasoned that his illness may be re-
lated to adrenal glands on his kidneys.8 After additional research, he refined his 
diagnosis to an autonomic nervous-system disorder.9 Lindsay presented his findings 
to a conference held by the National Dysautonomic Research Foundation, a charity 
committed to the condition he suffered.10 Lindsay’s disorder was almost unheard 
of, and most researchers in attendance had determined this diagnosis was highly 
improbable. While at the conference, Lindsay met Dr. H. Cecil Coghlan, a medical 
professor at the University of Alabama-Birmingham who believed Lindsay had pro-
posed a valid theory. Dr. Coghlan helped Lindsay repurpose a drug approved for an 
entirely different condition, and then helped Lindsay research and pioneer a surgery 
for his condition. Prior to surgery, Lindsay could sit for no more than an hour or 
two a day.11 Within two months of the surgery, he was able to walk a mile to church 
and went on a major vacation six months after that. 12 Had Lindsay not innovated 
with respect to both medicine and surgery, he would not have found a cure. Doctors 
had been unable to figure out what was going on with his body, and his situation 
was rare enough that there was no market to justify pharmaceutical company in-
vestment. 
While Lindsay’s story is multifaceted – involving physicians, non-profit organ-
izations committed to medical research, market failures for rare diseases, and more 
– this essay focuses on the law. Specifically, at which points in the patient innova-
tion process does law facilitate or hinder treatments, medicines, devices, and/or sur-
geries that a patient has determined, in consultation with providers, to be in her best 
interest, but deviates from the standard of care? Closely related, how does law affect 
the decisions of payers, primarily insurance companies, to manage situations in 
which well-informed patients challenge standard practice, sometimes in ways that 
are less expensive? 
II. THE STANDARD OF CARE, HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH, AND 
EXCEPTIONS FOR CLINICAL INNOVATION 
Even when patients come to their providers with ideas and innovations as to 
medications, devices, and treatment regimens, providers remain constrained by the 
standard of care of like physicians who treat the same ailment or condition.13 Inno-
vation is by definition the pioneering of new treatment options.14 The inherent con-
flict is clear: when a provider aids a patient or implements the patient’s innovative 
approach, she deviates from the standard of care. The resulting conflict is one be-
tween pushing new understandings of medicine to better treat patients and risking 
vulnerable patients on unproven or unknown procedures. Thus, there is a need for 
governance of the relationship to ensure that providers do not face excess liability 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Brook v. St. John’s Hickey Mem’l Hosp., 380 N.E.2d 72, 76 (1978). There are some modifi-
cations depending on local law. Some physicians are further held to the standard of physicians in that 
community. In most cases, the standard of care is also shaped by available resources like technology, 
staffing, and nearby tertiary care centers. 
 14. Innovation, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/innovation?s=t (last visited 
Nov. 23, 2020). 
3
Halabi and Richard: The Law of Patient Innovation
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020
248 B.E.T.R. [Vol. 4 2020 
and patients are adequately informed as to the standard of care and the risks that 
accompany the deviation and innovation.15 
For innovations so described, they are considered “research,” not medical prac-
tice, and the protections that humans enjoy when they are medical research subjects 
are extensive. Medical practice is defined by the Belmont Report16 as “interventions 
which are designed solely to enhance the well-being of an individual.”17 “Research” 
is defined as activity designed to test a hypothesis and thereby contribute to general 
knowledge.18 “Innovation” (other than research) is a significant departure from 
standard practices, but not necessarily subject to rigorous review for purposes of 
testing a hypothesis.19 
These distinctions are critical when discussing surgical innovation, especially. 
Surgeons frequently deviate from standard practices with each patient, as each is 
unique and requires the surgeon to tailor each operation.20 The law thus becomes 
amorphous and ill-defined at the boundary at which a surgeon is innovating or 
merely tailoring the surgery. 
Research generally lends itself to a rigorous process of approval and verifica-
tion, primarily to ensure that risks are balanced with benefits for human medical 
research subjects, and that the subjects are adequately informed of those risks. 
When attempting to add to the general knowledge of medicine, providers must be 
careful to take the proper steps and draw the correct conclusions.21 The Belmont 
Report is clear that an evaluation of efficacy or safety falls within the realm of re-
search.22 
Patient innovation therefore lies between the legal protection of medical mal-
practice tort liability and the protections offered (importantly by federal law as well 
as state) for human research subjects. 23 The malpractice pathway is one in which 
the provider is subject to minimal scrutiny while performing the innovative treat-
ment, but afterwards may be held liable in any malpractice suits that may be brought 
in tort.24 The human subjects research pathway is a more prospective approach, re-
quiring a greater degree of oversight and regulation, but minimizing liability for the 
doctor afterwards.25 
The medical practice pathway, from a legal standpoint, is a natural extension 
of basic tort and medical malpractice law. The patient needs the provider to under-
take the innovation, but the provider (and certainly its insurer) may be deterred by 
 
 15. See Anna C. Mastroianni, Liability, Regulation, and Policy in Surgical Innovation: The Cutting 
edge of Research and Therapy, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 351, 354 (2006). 
 16. See generally NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF 
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DHEW Pub. No. (OS) 78-0012, THE BELMONT REPORT: 
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH 11 
(1978). 
 17. Nancy M.P. King, The Line Between Clinical Innovation and Human Experimentation, 32 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 573, 573 (2002) (citing NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN 
SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DHEW Pub. No. (OS) 78-0012, THE 
BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS 
OF RESEARCH 11 (1978). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Mastroianni, supra note 13, at 361. 
 20. Id. at 364. 
 21. See Id. at 358-59. 
 22. Id. at 361. 
 23. Id. at 370-71. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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tort liability.26 A patient whose innovation has failed and results in real or perceived 
injuries will not only have the basic elements of a tort claim satisfied, but will in-
evitably have experts who will testify that the innovated procedure or treatment did 
not meet  the standard of care.27 In some cases, an innovative surgery may fall out-
side what is considered the customary practice; however, in other cases, courts ap-
pear to give great deference to defendant-physicians in exercising their best judge-
ment.28 Indeed, some courts recognize therapeutic innovation as a defense, carving 
out protections for physicians who make themselves knowledgeable about treat-
ment alternatives and work with patients to innovate in ways that promote patient 
welfare but do not arise to experimentation.29 
Alternatively, patient innovation may be advanced as research. Within the re-
search framework, the innovation process is necessarily researcher led, with spe-
cific rules that weigh risks to patients and ensure that they are effectively and com-
prehensively informed.30 The patient is made aware of all risks and benefits of the 
treatment, and sometimes even the physician is forced to re-examine their thinking 
and justifications for a procedure.31 Informed consent adds an ethical layer of pa-
tient protection to the legal one. 32 The process is overseen by an Institutional Re-
view Board (“IRB”) or ethics committee, which is charged with approving the re-
search protocol and monitoring patient benefits and risks over the course of the 
study.33 
Yet by its nature, the federally guided research process marginalizes patients. 
Patients are not generally interested in research design that contributes to 
knowledge, including requirements for double-blind clinical trials. They are inter-
ested in innovations that will promote their own health and lives.34 
Even the ethical criteria of patient research are tilted against patient-led inno-
vation.35 While an operation or procedure may pose risks desperate patients are 
willing to ignore at their peril, these same risks are weighed by Institutional Review 
Boards and ethics committees, who may give decisive weight to the benefits of not 
treating the patient, or not innovating.36 
Physicians are constrained legally by a potential for severe liability in the face 
of malpractice suits.37 Federal regulations guiding informed consent cabin the pa-
tient into a passive role.38 The informed consent process allows the patient to take 
an active role in the process only by permitting or prohibiting the innovative 
 
 26. Id. at 376. 
 27. Id. at 377 
 28. See Brook v. St. John’s Hickey Mem’l Hosp., 380 N.E.2d 72, 76 (1978) (holding that a physician 
injecting a contrast medium into the calves of a child instead of the standard gluteal muscle site was not 
a breach, as the physician adjudged it the prudent course after reading journal articles about injuries from 
injecting contrast medium in the wrong places). 
 29. Mastroianni, supra, note 13, at 380-81. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 416-18 
 32. See King, supra note 15, at 578. 
 33. 45 C.F.R. § 45.111 (2020); 21. C.F.R. § 56.111 (2020). 
 34. Mary E. Tinetti & Ethan Basch, Patients’ Responsibility to Participate in Decision Making and 
Research, 309(22) JAMA 2331, 2331 (2013). 
 35. King, supra note 15, at 573. 
 36. Id.at 581. 
 37. Alberto Galasso & Hong Luo, Physicians liability and medical innovation, VOX EU CEPR,(July 
24 2016), https://voxeu.org/article/physician-liability-and-medical-innovation. 
 38. See Benjamin Littenberg & Charles D. MacLean, Passive Consent for Clinical Research in the 
Age of HIPPA, 21(3) J. OF GEN. INTERNAL MED. 207, 211 (2016). 
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treatment solution offered by the physician.39 In short, patients have the final say in 
whether a treatment happens, and when a physician circumvents the patient’s ap-
proval, some courts have held the physician liable for battery.40 
III. THE LAW OF HEALTHCARE PAYMENT 
Even if a patient succeeds in convincing his or her physician that the risk of 
malpractice liability is negligible and decides to proceed outside the federally-reg-
ulated research process, who is to pay for potentially expensive innovations devel-
oped by patients?41 Insurance companies, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, and even charitable organizations typically make decisions as to whether 
to cover treatment based on proven safety, efficacy, and standard practice.42 
While patient innovation is driven by the unique resources of personal experi-
ence and dedication to life improvement, payers are able to utilize massive amounts 
of data regarding their customers (those same patients).43 Payers have significantly 
more information about the long-term effects of drugs and are able to push for in-
novation in light of that information. One such example was the removal of Vioxx 
from the market after Kaiser Permanente, a large integrated provider and payer, was 
able to demonstrate the drug caused fatal heart attacks.44 Vioxx was a new genera-
tion of pain medication developed by Merck. The drug obtained FDA approval.45 
However, years later, Kaiser Permanente undertook a study to compare patients 
who took the drug with those who had not and found that those who took it were 
significantly more likely to experience a heart attack.46 Kaiser Permanente could do 
this because of its considerable access to patient information. The information avail-
able to Kaiser was much larger in scope than that of Merck’s lab studies. After the 
results of the data were published, Vioxx was pulled from the market, and its risks 
were eliminated.47 
This story demonstrates that innovation for payers does not come in the form 
of any sort of physical good (i.e., the artificial pancreas or a new pain medication), 
but rather in the form of information.48 Payers are able to learn more about 
healthcare, as opposed to providing a physical, tangible innovation.49 
As a result, the current incentives for medical innovation (patents and exclu-
sivity) are generally not conducive to payer data innovation.50 In the absence of a 
new good to sell, payers keep secret the information they learn regarding health care 
 
 39. Mastroianni, supra note 13, at 416-18. 
 40. Id. at 417. 
 41. Sonali R. Mishra et al., “Not Just a Receiver”: Understanding Patient Behavior in the Hospital 
Environment, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING 
SYSTEMS. CHI CONFERENCE, 3103–3114 (May 2016), https://doi.org/10.1145/2858036.2858167 (“Dur-
ing these stays, patients are often viewed as passive recipients of care, rather than as active stakeholders 
who can make decisions and even prevent errors.”). 
 42. See Demonaco et al., supra note 4. 
 43. Rebecca S. Eisenberg & W. Nicholson Price, Promoting Healthcare Innovation on the Demand 
Side, 4(1) J.L.&BIOSCI. 3, 3 (2017). 
 44. Id. at 8. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Demonaco et al., supra note 4. 
 49. Eisenberg & Price, supra note 41, at 30. 
 50. Id. at 12. 
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and use what they learn for themselves to cut costs and increase profit where possi-
ble.51 Therefore, a patient who innovates as to treatment must not only prove its 
effectiveness, but also its cost efficiency, for purposes of most payer interests. The 
motivations payers have to innovate can be similar to, but may differ from, patients. 
While patients are seeking relief from disorders or symptoms, often payers are seek-
ing to minimize costs in healthcare.52 Payers usually target innovation that can re-
duce cost either by remaking a drug from prescription-only to over-the-counter, or 
by demonstrating that a newer and more expensive drug is not necessary compared 
to a cheaper, older drug.53 This sort of cost minimizing is only available to payers, 
as the other major actors in the healthcare system either are missing the resources 
or incentives to do so.54 The drug manufacturers and providers both seek a profit, 
and the patient has minimal access to the larger data necessary to drive the innova-
tion payers are able to create.55 
However, some advocates for patient innovation claim a comparative analysis 
of risk is possible. Demonaco argues the risks taken on by patients using home-
made devices and treatments should be compared to the risks a patient faces if not 
using any device at all. 56 When this paradigm is used, the benefits offered by a 
device may outweigh the risks it involves. Often, payers are willing to share their 
information with physicians, who may use it in some circumstances to aid patient 
innovations.57 
Payer innovation in aid of patient innovation may also advantage physicians. 
One such example is off-label prescription, or when a drug is used for something 
other than what it was produced and tested for by the manufacturer.58 Drug manu-
facturers have little to no incentive to undertake expensive trials for the efficacy of 
drugs in off-label uses.59 Payers can fill a vital role here by supporting the doctor’s 
off-label uses as a means for treatment and verifying its effectiveness with large-
scale data. Because a payer is the only one with access to broad spectrum data re-
garding treatment practices of patients, they are able to confirm an off-label use as 
effective or not and have an incentive to do so.60 
Doctors, then, are exercising a healthy and justified skepticism regarding pa-
tient innovation. A homemade remedy or device can be incredibly risky for the pa-
tient. Additionally, a patient offering an opinion on their treatment in the face of a 
doctor’s expertise is, at the least, unhelpful. In the rare instance that a patient can 
research sufficiently as to discuss with confidence their own ailments and potential 
treatments, doctors still act with trepidation upon a patient’s recommendations.61 
Payers present a slightly different story in that they are equipped with patient data 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Demonaco et al., supra note 4. 
 57. Eisenberg & Price, supra note 41, at 30. 
 58. Sam F. Halabi, Off-Label Marketing’s Audiences: The 21st Century Cures Act and the Relaxation 
of Standards for Evidence-Based Therapeutic and Cost-Comparative Claims, 44 AMERICAN JOURNAL 
OF LAW & MEDICINE 181 (2018). 
 59. Id.at 18. 
 60. Id. at 19. 
 61. Rebecca E. Say &Richard Thomson, The Importance of Patient Preferences in Treatment Deci-
sions–Challenges for Doctors, 327 BMJ 542, 544 (2003). 
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exceeding that of providers or even drug testing by manufacturers.62 While often 
the interests of providers and payers collide, much can be accomplished when the 
two are able to cooperate.63 
Relatively little writing or literature is available regarding the attitude an insur-
ance company may have towards, say, Doug Lindsay’s situation. After all, it would 
be a hard pitch to an insurance company to get them to greenlight a surgery created 
by their customer. However, Eisenberg talks at length about the primary motivation 
of payer innovation: profit.64 It is perfectly reasonable to assume, then, that an in-
surance company may be at least interested in covering the cost of cheaper and more 
effective treatments, despite them being created by the patient. For example, in 
Lindsay’s situation, the two choices are to continue a lifetime of high-cost care, in 
and out of hospitals and paying for expensive treatments that doctors are uncertain 
about; or paying for one surgery that Doug has prepared a lengthy treatise to demon-
strate the possibility of a cure. With the success of Lindsay’s surgery came an elim-
ination of costly treatments, so it appears logical the payer would support these in-
novations where it can. Another example is the artificial pancreas, as discussed by 
Demonaco.65 A combination of a basic insulin pump and a cheap ($30) computer 
can create a more effective treatment than the constant use of disposable test kits 
and costly doctor’s appointments.66 So, considering the profit incentive, it makes 
sense for a payer in many situations to financially support patient innovation in 
some measure. 
The patient innovator has several complicated motivations, ranging from solv-
ing their own ailments, to helping others do the same, to potentially making a mar-
ketable product. The payer is interested in profit.67 Payers innovate where profit 
intersects with new knowledge. For example, Blue Cross worked to get a non-sed-
ative antihistamine approved as an over-the-counter (OTC) medication instead of 
one requiring a prescription.68 The manufacturers of the non-sedative antihistamine 
were resistant to change the drug to OTC, so as to maximize the amount of time 
they had the exclusive right to sell the drug. However, Blue Cross California 
demonstrated that the non-sedative was just as safe if not safer than standard (se-
dating) antihistamines, and thus should be approved as an over-the-counter alterna-
tive.69 
The other side of this coin is the efficiency check payers offer on the system.70 
Often, manufacturers and providers are creating newer and more elaborate forms of 
treatment (new drugs, devices, procedures, and methods) that cost more, and may 
or may not be more effective than the previous treatments. The payer offers a check 
on this by working to determine what is the most efficient method of treatment. One 
example is payer research into precision medicine.71 This is a form of treatment 
 
 62. Jeff Lagasse, Better Data Sharing Between Payers, Providers Can Move the Needle on Social 
Determinants of Health, (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/better-data-
sharing-between-patients-providers-can-move-needle-social-determinants-health. 
 63. See Id. 
 64. Eisenberg & Price, supra note 41, at 5. 
 65. See Demonaco et al., supra note 4. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Eisenberg & Price, supra note 41. 
 68. Id. at 8. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 18. 
 71. Id. at 21. 
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where a genetic test is taken of a patient to identify what drugs would be the most 
effective in the patient due to their genetic makeup.72 The resulting treatment is able 
to specifically target those who would benefit from a preventative drug (such as 
Herceptin, used to prevent breast cancer).73 This interests large drug manufacturers 
less because they are interested in ensuring as many people purchase and consume 
their drug as possible. But it aligns neatly with what payers want, to ensure only 
those who need treatment are getting it. This forced efficiency acts as a check on 
the drug makers in a way that benefits patients as well as payers. 
The primary resource payers are utilizing for innovation is their data.74 Many 
payers do not have their own drug researchers or clinical lab studies, but they have 
access to all the healthcare information of their clients. From doctor visits to pre-
scriptions to diagnoses, payers know a great deal about those for whom they issue 
payments This offers them an opportunity that drug manufacturers and even pro-
viders do not have. With a large-scale and long-term view of all of their patients, 
payers are much more able to recognize trends that others may not. A manufacturer 
may not understand the long-term effects of its drug, especially when those effects 
materialize outside the time of a clinical study. A provider may not realize their 
patient is seeing another doctor for something that seems unrelated but can tie into 
their work (such as patients prescribed Vioxx seeking a cardiologist). And a patient 
has no way of knowing their experience is part of a larger trend. The only one who 
can really step into this place is the payer who is seeking to reduce their costs by 
implementing new standards based on the large-scale data they have. 
Another hurdle is the data itself. The reality is that perfect data about imperfect 
humans is very difficult, if not impossible, to collect. There are a myriad of prob-
lems encountered in the data.75 First, patients change payers over their lives. A payer 
does not always have life-long data on one patient, as they move around between 
providers.76 Additionally, secrecy (as discussed above)77 and HIPAA dis-incentiv-
izes payers from sharing patient data with patients who might benefit from it.78 
There is no standardized format for data of health records, so it can be difficult or 
impossible to merge data across payers.79 
IV. THE LAW OF DRUG AND DEVICE REGULATION 
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration is the most important regulator of 
drugs and devices relevant to patient innovation.80 As the authority on guidelines 
and safe practices, compliance with their standards is necessary to offer innovations 
in a commercial setting. This review, approval, and subsequent compliance with 
FDA regulations is expensive and often cost-prohibitive for treatments with small 
markets.81 
 
 72. Id. at 20-21. 
 73. Id. at 20. 
 74. Id. at 12. 
 75. Id. at 23.  
 76. Id. at 22. 
 77. See discussion supra Part III. 
 78. See discussion supra Part III. 
 79. Eisenberg & Price, supra note 41, at 5. 
 80. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, FDA AT A GLANCE (October 2019), available at 
https://www.fda.gov/media/131874/download. 
 81. See Demonaco et al., supra note 4. 
9
Halabi and Richard: The Law of Patient Innovation
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2020
254 B.E.T.R. [Vol. 4 2020 
Patient innovators circumvent this by avoiding commercialization. 90% of pa-
tient innovators offer their designs and inventions for free to the public.82 Because 
these patients are not selling their developments, they do not need to conduct large-
scale tests of their product, and instead can simply make it and share what they 
found works with others in similar situations.83 Under the commerce clause, the 
FDA cannot regulate noncommercial activity.84 Patient innovators are seeking some 
form of treatment for their own needs, thus their reward and motivation is not profit, 
but rather relief from symptoms or a cure.85 
Payers encounter the FDA in more complicated ways. The FDA works closely 
with manufacturers to ensure sufficient testing is being performed. Because payers 
want to learn more about drugs on the market, the FDA prefers not to be involved.86 
The FDA states their “institutional mission is approving new drugs, not re-evaluat-
ing already approved drugs.”87 The FDA prefers to rely on clinical studies over 
observational studies.88 
The FDA encourages drug manufacturers to research off-label uses for their 
drugs to assist in off-label innovation.89 The FDA prohibits the active marketing of 
off-label uses, but even that assertion has receded in the face of some First Amend-
ment challenges, which have argued that all parties should be able to make truthful, 
non-misleading statements about drugs, even off-label uses.90 
The FDA has adapted the payer’s model of developing patient records for its 
own research purposes, which carries an indirect approval of payer methods. In 
what is called the Sentinel Program, the FDA has established a network of patient 
records so as to monitor the long-term effects of drugs.91 
In sum, the FDA appears to be apathetic at best and resistant at worst toward 
patient innovation. Patients who develop their own cures or devices must circum-
navigate the FDA by sidestepping the bases of federal jurisdiction. The FDA has 
not taken an overtly hostile position towards these patient innovators who stay 
within the non-commercial space.92 Payers face both hurdles and assistance from 
the FDA: sometimes they are resistant towards re-examining a drug in light of new 
evidence, other times they work closely with payers to research the efficacy and 
safety of drugs with long-term data, and recently they have begun adapting payer 
methods to do research for themselves. 
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V. THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Innovations may also be valuable in ways that are sufficient to be protected by 
patents, copyrights, or trademarks.93  Given the potential financial interests, a con-
flict of interest may develop between the patient and the provider as to who “owns” 
all or most aspects of the innovation.  While surgical processes are notoriously dif-
ficult to protect with intellectual property mechanisms, devices may in fact be very 
valuable, especially some that patients have developed like those relevant to physi-
cal therapy.94 
In the well-known case of Moore v. The Regents of the University of California, 
a patient sued the doctor who treated him for hairy-cell leukemia, challenging the 
physician’s orders to remove his spleen as well as “blood, bone marrow aspirate, 
and other bodily substances,” The patient alleged that the physician’s intent to use 
those substances in potentially lucrative clinical research conflicted with the pa-
tient’s interest in the best health outcome.95  The Supreme Court of California de-
termined that the physician had breached his fiduciary duty, not of loyalty, but of 
disclosure, since the economic interest of a physician may be material to a patient’s 
decision. 96 
[A] physician who is seeking a patient’s consent for a medical procedure must, 
in order to satisfy his fiduciary duty and to obtain the patient’s informed consent, 
disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient’s health, whether research or eco-
nomic, that may affect his medical judgment.97 
In that decision, the court adopted the “reasonable patient” standard when de-
termining materiality. 98 Most courts have adopted a “reasonable physician” inquiry 
that operates much like a standard of care analysis privileging physicians’ opinions 
of one another, not the trust relationship they share with the patient. 99 
Several courts have held that physicians have an affirmative duty to disclose 
information that will affect a patient’s care.100  For instance, physicians have an 
affirmative duty to disclose to patients any financial interest in clinical research.101 
What happens when a patient comes to the physician with a potentially lucrative 
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idea? How might patient interest in healing and physician interest in a patent com-
promise the patient innovation possibilities? 
Indeed, by choosing to seek out and desire medicine labeled “cutting edge” and 
innovative, patients drive demand for those who innovate and may be interested in 
such incentives.102 Surgeons in particular are driven by prestige and economic de-
mand to innovate. It is not just patients who drive this demand. The best hospitals 
want pioneering surgeons, media attention is given to those who can make a break-
through, and academic communities give prestige to innovative surgeons.103 All of 
this acts as a drive for surgeons to be the next pioneer, and at the forefront of that is 
the patient who demands a new treatment for their ailment. Should patients decide 
they no longer desire innovative surgeries, there would be little financial incentive 
for surgeons and providers to continue pushing new bounds. While the raw demand 
for an innovative procedure results in providers willing to do so, the flip side is the 
risk the patient offers as a potential liability for the provider.104 When a new proce-
dure becomes available, there is a lifecycle of malpractice suits that arise, driving 
physicians to perfect and stabilize the procedures and make patients safer.105 
VI. SOLUTIONS 
Ultimately, there is a balance that must be sought among the competing legal 
interests outlined above: innovating and advancing human understanding of medi-
cine, while maintaining the safety and agency of patients. This balance is what the 
federal Belmont Report sought, as well as subsequent federal regulations on inno-
vation.106 The current attitude by legal scholars appears to be a desire to increase 
oversight and place more restrictions on innovation.107 Recommendations center 
around increasing oversight through registries and standardizing decision-making 
for physicians. The benefits are obvious, fewer rogue physicians means fewer inju-
ries. But the downsides to restricting innovation to established standards of care or 
expensive formalized research are important to consider as well. 
One solution may be expanding what is considered the standard of care. If we 
simply consider the standard of care to be what other doctors in the same situation 
do, then we will see only incremental improvements, as the common law contem-
plates.108 However, if we expand the standard of care to both allow for innovation 
and require adherence to certain guidelines, it is a promising middle ground. 
Some jurisdictions are already doing this. In Henrich v. Sweet, the 1st Circuit 
indicated having a procedure reviewed by an Institutional Review Board before im-
plementing it upon a patient may serve as a partial defense to malpractice claims.109 
This allows for a patient and her doctor to practice somewhat outside standards of 
practice, but only at the approval of neutral observers who may adjudge the risks 
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and benefits better than the doctor or the patient. By expanding the standard of care 
to not simply cover the actions of the doctor immediately surrounding the treatment 
of the patient, but rather including how they go about seeking professional review, 
it may be possible to limit the risks of rogue treatment while also allowing doctors 
to innovate in a streamlined manner. 
Establishing a standard of care that requires doctors to submit to oversight from 
Institutional Review Boards or federal guidelines, and patients to give informed 
consent can result in patients being treated safely and doctors being able to innovate 
and pioneer new treatment. Doug Lindsay’s story has what appears to be a typical 
demonstration of a doctor’s attitude to patient innovation. Many of the doctors Doug 
met with were skeptical of his theories and proposed treatment plans.110 This comes 
with good reason, too. Often, patients know little beyond what their body tells them. 
“I’m chronically exhausted” can be the symptom of a wide array of symptoms, and 
it seems unreasonable that a patient should have much say in diagnosis theorizing 
as the individual with years of training and experience in this subject. It took Doug 
attending the conference of Dysautonomic Researchers with years of his own re-
search into this narrow topic before even one person at the conference listened to 
him.111 Later, when he designed a surgery, he prepared over 300 pages of research, 
plans, and evidence of the efficacy of this surgery, and he still had to pitch it to 
many, many surgeons before one of them agreed to perform it.112 The risks faced 
by surgeons who agree to perform unproven surgeries can include financial loss in 
the form of malpractice suits and loss of their license.113 
Payers could open up more channels to receive innovative and cost-effective 
ideas from patients.  Many have some limited forums for patient feedback; most 
have some sort of technological review for recently approved or contemplated drugs 
and devices.  These arms of insurance companies could be expanded and some of 
their own research resources dedicated to mining their own data to confirm experi-
mental hypotheses. The information could be published for patients to consult with 
their physicians. 
With respect to intellectual property, the problems are more difficult to solve, 
but they may be rarer.  Use of medications off-label is likely to mean that they are 
no longer protected by patents in any case.114  Surgical methods are already difficult 
or impossible to patent.115 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Patient innovation is an important step in the decades-long movement toward 
patient autonomy, agency, and sovereignty.  This essay has endeavored to outline 
some of the main legal barriers and questions that surround patient innovations, the 
physicians, payers, and regulators that surround them.  As these innovations 
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advance with more access by patients to more information, hopefully, it will provide 
a useful guide to addressing the many complicated questions that will arise. 
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